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INTRODUCTION 
The identification of parameters predictive of social 
influence has long been an important goal of social 
psychology. Although the current literature still leaves 
many issues unresolved, a general rule has emerged from 
years of research: there is strength in numbers. The notion 
that faction size plays a critical role in social influence 
is central to three different models of social influence 
that are relevant to the present paper: social impact theory 
(Latane, 1981), other-total ratio (Mullen, 1983), and social 
influence model (Tanford & Penrod, 1984). A detailed 
description of each model is beyond the scope of this 
proposal. However, social impact theory (SIT) will be 
discussed most thoroughly, and other-total ratio (OTR) and 
social influence models (SIM) will be contrasted to it. 
Models of Social Influence 
Social impact theory (Latane, 1981) describes the 
process of social influence as a function involving three 
variables: strength, immediacy, and number of influence 
sources. These variables are multiplicatively related, as 
shown in Equation 1: 
I = f (SIN) (1) 
where I is influence or impact, s is the strength of the 
influencing source, I is the immediacy of the source, and N 
is the number of influencing sources. 
Strength refers to the source of influence, and 
includes factors such as economic and social status, age, 
and past incidents that involved the source exerting power 
over the target. Immediacy refers to the physical 
proximity of the source with respect to the target. Number 
refers to the number of influencing sources. 
Although Latane considers all three factors (strength, 
immediacy, and number) equally important determinants of 
social influence, he focuses primarily on certain 
psychosocial laws, to be discussed presently. These laws 
deal solely with the Number parameter in Equation 1. The 
first psychosocial law, shown in Equation 2: 
( 2 ) 
2 
suggests that the amount of social impact (I) a target will 
experience is equal to a scaling constant (s) multiplied by 
the number of influencing sources (N) raised to some 
exponent (t). The exponent will always be less than one, 
and the first few sources of influence will have a stronger 
impact upon the target than will the subsequent sources 
because impact is assumed to be related to a root of the 
number of influencing sources. Latane argues that just as a 
target presumably experiences a stronger and more powerful 
form of influence as the number of sources increases, a 
source's influential force will be divided amongst the 
targets as the number of targets increases. This is 
represented by the second psychosocial law, presented in 
Equation 3: 
I=sN~ ( 3 ) 
This law implies that each individual target will be less 
influenced or persuaded by an influential message as the 
number of targets increases. 
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Most empirical tests of social impact theory have been 
directed towards the two psychosocial laws, rather than the 
complete model proposed by Latane. The diverse nature of 
dependent variables used in these studies suggests that 
these laws adequately describe social influence in many 
domains (e.g., tipping in restaurants, stage fright, worker 
productivity, classroom behavior, bystander intervention; 
see Latane, 1981, for a review). However, the value of the 
exponent (t) is allowed to vary from study to study without 
theoretical explanation. The empirically derived value 
assigned to the exponent has led some theorists to argue 
that the psychosocial laws lack predictive power (Mullen, 
1985). It is important to note, though, that the 
psychosocial laws are indeed predictive in that they predict 
the function form for patterns associated with influence 
produced by different sized factions (e.g., marginally 
decreasing impact). These patterns predicted by SIT have 
received considerable support and Latane has actually shown 
that data from past research, when reanalyzed, are in line 
with SIT (Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Connolley, 1968; Latane & 
Darley, 1970; 1975). 
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Self-attention theory (Carver & Sheier, 1981) serves as 
the theoretical foundation for a second model of social 
influence, the other-total ratio (Mullen, 1983). This model 
proposes that faction size alone predicts social influence, 
and that for any individual the OTR is equal to the number 
of members in his/her opposing faction divided by the total 
number of group members. For example the OTR for a single 
individual facing a majority of 3 would be 3/4. This model 
makes predictions quite similar to those of the psychosocial 
laws proposed by Latane in that it proposes that influence 
should increase in a marginally decreasing fashion as 
members are added to the opposing faction. This similarity 
in predictions, as well as the relative lack of empirical 
data in support of Latane's complete model of social 
influence, has led Mullen (1985) to argue that the 
other-total ratio is a more parsimonious conceptualization 
of social influence (but see Jackson, 1986, for a 
counterargument). 
The third model of social influence (Tanford & Penrod, 
1984) differs from SIT in that it assumes individual 
differences in susceptibility to persuasion, and includes a 
parameter corresponding to such differences. Another 
parameter of SIM corresponds to the interactive nature of 
influence and allows for reciprocal influence effects. It 
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should be noted, however, that Jackson (1987) extended SIT 
so that it is also capable of capturing the interactive 
nature of social influence. A parameter unique to SIM takes 
into account the consistency level of the sources. Lastly, 
SIM, like the previously discussed models, considers the 
number of influencing sources to be a critical predictor of 
influence. 
Perhaps the largest difference between SIM and SIT, 
notwithstanding the additional parameters, is that SIM 
predicts that influence will reach an asymptote at N=4 in 
most majority paradigms. SIT, on the other hand, predicts 
no limit or absolute amount of influence that may be 
experienced by a target, and, thus, the addition of sources 
will always result in an increase in influence. It is for 
this reason that the data from the Asch studies (1951; 1952; 
1956) do not fit the pattern predicted by the SIT 
psychosocial laws. Asch found that the amount of influence 
did not systematically increase with the addition of 
sources, but, rather, leveled off after the third source of 
influence was added. 
Empirical Test of the Three Models 
Despite the differences in the predictions made by each 
of the three models discussed, Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, 
Nagao & Hinsz (1990) have shown that there are almost no 
differences in the degree to which the models can fit the 
data collected in a model-testing investigation. Predictions 
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made by SIT, SIM, and OTR, were tested in freely interacting 
groups. Tindale et al. (1990) also manipulated group 
composition (the number of minority and majority members), 
counterbalanced for the direction in which group members 
argued, and group size (ranging from three to six). 
Perhaps the most relevant finding with respect to this 
proposal is that shifts indicating that the minority faction 
was influential were found in only three out of twelve 
groups that had a minority faction (i.e., groups comprised 
of four majority members favoring a guilty verdict/two 
minority members favoring a not guilty verdict, three 
majority members favoring a guilty verdict/two minority 
members favoring a not guilty verdict, and two majority 
members favoring a guilty verdict/one minority member 
favoring a not guilty verdict). It is important to note 
here that group composition alone cannot account for these 
shifts because group composition was counterbalanced for 
argument direction, and three group compositions with the 
majority favoring not guilty did not show the slight shift 
toward the minority position. Most surprisingly, the 
majority factions of the remaining nine groups shifted in a 
direction opposite that of the minority faction and became 
more extreme. These results do not correspond to the 
predictions made by any of the three models of social 
influence tested, because SIT, SIM and OTR predict that 
minority members have some impact, however slight, upon the 
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majority members. 
Although these data appear to show that minorities 
(especially minorities of one) have basically no impact 
(under some circumstances) on the opinions of the majority 
group members, such a conclusion is premature. It is 
possible that the minority members of the groups in the 
Tindale et al. (1990) study were influential to the extent 
that they prevented majority members from becoming even more 
extreme in their final decision. If this were the case, the 
influence of the minority members would have been analogous 
to a reign or a weight, holding the majority members back. 
Unfortunately, the nature of the data in this investigation 
do not allow us to explore this possibility. In order to 
measure directly the impact of minority factions, it is 
critical to compare groups with minority factions to those 
without such factions. Furthermore, Tindale et al. did not 
attempt to address whether minority and majority influence 
differ qualitatively, rather than quantitatively, as 
proposed in recent theoretical work in this area (see 
reviews by Levine, 1980; Levine & Russo, 1987; Maass & 
Clark, 1984; Maass, West, & Cialdini, 1987). 
Qualitative Differences in Majority and Minority Influence 
The models of social influence proposed by Latane 
(1981), Tanford and Penrod (1984), and Mullen (1983) suggest 
that minority and majority influence differ only 
quantitatively, and, therefore, are part of the same 
underlying process. In contrast, Moscovici (1980) argued 
that minority and majority influence are qualitatively 
different, with the former resulting in private acceptance 
and eventual internalization of new ideas, and the latter 
resulting only in public compliance. Furthermore, Moscovici 
has attributed these differences to the behavioral style of 
the source, and has identified several characteristics 
typical of an influential minority source, including 
autonomy, a lack of rigidity, the use of logical arguments, 
fairness, and consistency. Moscovici has argued that these 
traits (presented by the source and/or perceived by the 
recipient) lead the recipient of a message to process the 
arguments differently, and that this different type of 
processing leads to permanent attitude change. 
Majority influence, according to Moscovici, is assumed 
to provoke peripheral cognitive processes, leading only to 
public compliance (see Chaiken, 1987 or Petty & Cacioppo, 
1981 for a discussion of the differences between central 
route and peripheral cognitive processing). Tanford and 
Penrod (1984) noted that the characteristics named by 
Moscovici are not necessarily specific to minority 
influence, and considered source consistency a critical 
parameter for both majority and minority influence. 
Moscovici's (1980) notion that minority influence is 
more likely than majority influence to lead to permanent 
internalization has led many theorists to explore the two 
8 
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influence types in light of a simple, but crucial, 
experimental manipulation: private versus public expression 
of attitude change. Maass and Clark (1983) conducted two 
experiments in an attempt to find support for such a dual 
process model of social influence. The authors employed a 
methodological and theoretical synthesis of two 
independently developed theories - one addressing attitude 
change in general (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), and the other 
specific to minority and majority influence (Moscovici, 
1980). Much in line with both Petty & Cacioppo's 
elaboration likelihood model of attitude change, and 
Moscovici's notion of conversion behavior, the authors 
proposed that the underlying cognitive processes mediating 
minority influence generate arguments and counterarguments 
that lead to permanent attitude change. Majority influence, 
on the other hand, provokes peripheral cognitive processes 
that lead to public compliance, rather than private 
acceptance. 
In Experiment 1, the authors were primarily interested 
in the direction in which subjects' attitudes toward a 
source would shift in public versus private situations. 
They simultaneously exposed subjects to both majority and 
minority influence sources. Subjects with moderate attitudes 
toward gay rights were exposed to a summary of a discussion 
about gay rights held by five college students at their 
university. In half of the conditions, four individuals 
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(the majority) argued in favor of, and one individual (the 
minority) argued against, gay rights. In the other half of 
the conditions, the majority and minority arguments were 
reversed. All subjects were then asked to respond to four 
attitude scales regarding gay rights. 
In the public compliance condition the subjects were 
told that they would join the discussion group, and that 
their response to the attitude scales would be seen by the 
five students prior to their joining the group. In the 
private condition, the subjects placed their "anonymous" 
responses to the attitude scales in a ballot box. 
The results indicated that subjects shifted towards the 
majority position in the public conditions and towards the 
minority in the private conditions. This difference in 
shifting is also reported in many other studies attempting 
to show the power of minority influence (Moscovici & Lage, 
1976; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980; Personnaz, 1981). 
Experiment 2 (Maass & Clark, 1983) was designed to 
explore further the dual process model of social influence 
by examining the arguments and counterarguments generated by 
subjects in the same experimental conditions utilized in 
Experiment 1. It was expected that the results from 
Experiment 1 would be replicated. The authors also 
hypothesized that the minority source of influence would 
stimulate the subjects to generate more arguments and 
counterarguments than would the majority source of 
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influence. Finally, they also predicted that the generated 
arguments would mediate private acceptance but not public 
compliance. After reading the discussion summary, each 
subject was given fifteen minutes to fill six "idea spaces" 
with arguments and counterarguments for each source of 
influence. 
The shift toward the minority in private, and toward 
the majority in public was found once again in Experiment 2. 
However, contrary to the second hypothesis, the minority 
influence source failed to provoke the generation of more 
arguments, regardless of direction. The third, and perhaps 
most critical, hypothesis: that generated arguments would 
mediate private acceptance but not public compliance,was 
supported. This finding led the authors to propose that it 
is not cognitive activity per se, but rather the quality of 
cognitive activity that accounts for differences in 
shifting. 
In line with this argument, Nemeth (1986) has proposed 
that minority influence inspires individuals to think 
divergently, whereas majority influence forces individuals 
to think convergently. Divergent thinking (Guilford, 1956) 
is characterized by idea "fluency" (the generation of many 
ideas) and idea "flexibility" (the generation of ideas from 
several distinct idea classes or categories), whereas 
convergent thinking involves the generation of one idea that 
is representative of the dominant or normative response set. 
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The propensity of majority influence to provoke convergent 
thinking has been explained theoretically in light of the 
extensive literature on group creativity (Nemeth, 1986). 
Interacting groups are less likely to generate an idea that 
is more novel, atypical, or creative than are nominal groups 
with individuals working alone (McGrath, 1984). This 
difference is probably the result of the tendency of the 
individual group members to move toward uniformity, and of 
each individual group member's fear of being ridiculed for 
the generation of a "bad" idea. 
Nemeth (1986) claimed that an individual facing 
majority influence will behave in a similar manner (i.e., 
less likely to generate novel ideas) for the same reasons. 
Minority influence, on the other hand, inspires the 
individual to think about novel and creative ideas. It is 
not clear whether this process is the result of modeling 
(e.g., individuals see other individuals who think in what 
appears to be a divergent fashion and choose to do so 
themselves), or if mere exposure to non-dominant arguments 
inspires one to think divergently. Nevertheless, Nemeth 
provides much experimental evidence in support of the notion 
that minorities are more capable than majorities to inspire 
divergent thinking (Nemeth & Kwan, 1985; Nemeth & Wachtler, 
1983). 
Perhaps most relevant to the approach taken in this 
paper is the study by Nemeth and Kwan (1985), in which it 
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was shown not only that individuals who are exposed to 
minority influence think more divergently, but also that 
this thought style generalizes to subsequent unrelated 
tasks. Nemeth & Kwan (1985) first exposed subjects to 
either majority or minority influence in a color perception 
task (much like the technique used in earlier Moscovici 
studies). Following this task, subjects were asked to free 
associate with the colors green and blue (the colors used in 
the color perception task). Those who had been exposed to 
minority influence in the previous task gave more original 
responses (i.e., statistically infrequent according to a 
normative list) than those who were exposed to majority 
influence for both colors. These data also lend support to 
the notion that majority influence provokes convergent 
thinking, in that individuals who were exposed to majority 
influence gave responses that were more conventional than a 
control group that did not participate in the color 
perception task. 
Majority and minority influence have rarely been 
studied in the context of freely interacting groups. The 
reliance on confederates in most studies of social influence 
may have some very serious effects upon the results obtained 
in such studies, and these effects may be most critical with 
respect to minority influence. Assuming that influence is 
an interactive phenomenon, and that minority members will be 
influenced by majority members and vice versa, it is 
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critical to use true members of each influence type in order 
to understand fully the impact of both majorities and 
minorities. 
Maass and Clark (1983) did make an attempt to expose 
subjects to each influence type by using subjects whom they 
assumed would consider themselves neither a member of the 
majority nor the minority (they all had moderate attitudes 
towards gay rights), but their method of accomplishing this 
should be questioned. The experimenters assumed that 
subjects with moderate attitudes were neutral with respect 
to gay rights, a potentially tenuous assumption. 
Furthermore, a moderate attitude, by their definition, was 
one that fell within the range of 2.75 and 5.25 on a seven 
point scale. Given the broad range of what the authors 
consider moderate, it seems possible that subjects with an 
"extreme moderate" (e.g., 5.25) pro attitude could consider 
themselves as members of either the "pro gay rights" 
minority or majority, rather than as a neutral figure. 
Perhaps more important, even though subjects were being 
exposed simultaneously to both influence types, they were 
reading the arguments from a prepared script and had no 
opportunity to act as influencing agents themselves, or to 
experience the feedback from fellow group members. A better 
method of accomplishing the simultaneous exposure to both 
influence types would involve using freely interacting 
groups with both minority and majority members. 
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In light of the behavioral characteristics assumed to 
be critical predictors of the degree to which a minority 
member will be influential (perhaps with consistency being 
the most important attribute), one could expect to find 
different results when all minority and majority members are 
truly allowed to become influenced and behave accordingly. 
outline of the Present Study and Research Hypotheses 
It was pointed out earlier that the impact of minority 
factions cannot be completely understood or measured without 
the use of a control group consisting of no minority 
faction. By contrasting the two types of group composition 
(groups with a minority faction and groups with no minority 
faction), one can draw conclusions with respect to the 
amount of influence exerted by the minority faction. Such a 
control group was utilized in the present study. The main 
purpose of this study was to measure the degree of minority 
impact on majority members by comparing the post group 
discussion attitudes for majority members in groups that do 
versus do not contain a minority faction (i.e., unanimous 
groups vs. groups with one or two minority members). The 
possibility that minority influence is qualitatively 
different in nature was also explored. 
It was hypothesized that unanimous groups will, on the 
average, become more polarized in their final 
post-discussion attitudes than those with minorities 
present. Similarly, groups with larger minority factions 
16 
were hypothesized to be, on the average, more moderate than 
those with only one minority member; that is, minorities of 
two will be more powerful than minorities of one. This 
prediction is much in line with previous studies of minority 
influence (Arbuthnot & Wayner, 1982; Bray Johnson, & 
Chilstrom, 1982; Tindale et al., 1990), and with the three 
models of social influence discussed earlier (Latane, 1981; 
Mullen, 1983; Tanford & Penrod, 1984). 
Possible qualitative differences between the two 
influence types were also explored using a method similar to 
that used by Maass and Clark (1983). It was hypothesized 
that majority members in groups with a minority faction 
would generate more thoughts than those in unanimous groups. 
It was also hypothesized that the arguments generated by 
individuals who were members of groups with a minority 
faction would be more flexible in nature (representative of 
both sides of the argument). 
As mentioned earlier, Nemeth (1986) has concluded that 
minorities inspire divergent thinking in different 
conceptual domains. As a direct test of this assertion, the 
subjects in the present experiment were asked to generate 
arguments for another social issue that was unrelated to the 
issue they discussed as a group. Thus, for this particular 
issue it was expected that majority members of groups with 
minority factions would generate more ideas as well as ideas 
that were more flexible in nature, than members who were 
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part of unanimous groups. 
METHOD 
subjects 
The subjects were 150 undergraduate students drawn from 
the Loyola University, Chicago subject pool. The data were 
collected in single gender groups in an attempt to avoid the 
possibility of confounding gender and influence type. 
Subjects participated for approximately one hour and 
received course credit for their participation. 
Design 
Because the major factor of interest in this study was 
group composition, five person groups with the following 
compositions were formed: ten groups of five individuals, in 
which all members were in favor of the government passing a 
law that would establish English as the official language of 
the United States; ten groups of five individuals, in which 
four members were in favor and one member was opposed to the 
government passing a law that would establish English as the 
official language of the United States; and finally, ten 
groups of five individuals, in which three members were in 
favor and two members were opposed to the government passing 
a law that would establish English as the official language 
of the United States. Thus, a one factor design with three 
levels was used. Several dependent measures designed to 
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investigate the possible qualitative differences between 
majority and minority influence were collected along with 
post-discussion attitude scores. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, subjects were seated at a large table. 
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They were informed that they would take part in a group 
discussion, and that the discussion would be audiotaped. 
First, subjects responded to a pretest comprised of two 
questions regarding the government passing a law that would 
establish English as the official language of the United 
States (see Appendix A). The first question required the 
subjects to respond categorically (in favor/against) to the 
issue of establishing English as the official language of 
the United states, and the second question required them to 
respond to a 21-point bipolar scale (ranging from 50 to -50 
in intervals of 5, with a midpoint of zero) indicating the 
degree to which he/she was in favor/against the issue. The 
21-point bipolar scale was used in an attempt to minimize 
the chances of obtaining ceiling effects. This particular 
issue was selected based on pilot test data, collected 
during the Fall semester 1991, that indicated that 
approximately 85.4% of undergraduate psychology students 
were in favor of, and 14.6% were opposed to the government 
passing a law that would establish English as the official 
language of the United states. This distribution allowed 
for the formation of groups according to the experimental 
20 
design mentioned previously. 
After responding to the pretest, subjects in the group 
conditions were asked to discuss with their fellow group 
members for approximately seven minutes the issue of our 
government passing a law that would establish English as the 
official language of the United States. All discussions 
were audiotaped in order to keep track of the arguments 
generated during discussions, and of which source of 
influence (minority or majority) generated each argument. 
Group consensus was not required or requested. After group 
discussion, all subjects were asked to respond to the 
100-point scale and to state their position regarding the 
issue just discussed. All subjects were then instructed to 
work independently, and to generate a list of thoughts 
relevant to the issue (see Appendix B). Although the 
subjects were verbally instructed to generate only a list of 
relevant thoughts regarding the issue, they were given two 
sheets of paper divided into two columns 
(arguments/counterarguments) and told to place each of their 
thoughts in the appropriate column. Subjects were told that 
they should not feel as if they had to fill in an equal 
number of spaces on each side, but rather to list all of the 
thoughts that came to their mind. 
After listing their thoughts, the subjects responded 
both categorically and to a 21-point bipolar scale (ranging 
from 50 to -50 in intervals of five with a midpoint of zero) 
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regarding the issue of allowing homosexuals to marry legally 
(see Appendix C). The subjects were then asked to generate 
thoughts regarding this issue (see Appendix D) using the 
same format as for the first issue. Upon completion of the 
final task, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation (see Appendix E). 
Results 
In the context of this study, minority and majority 
influence can be gauged primarily by the direction of the 
movement of subjects' responses on the 21-point bipolar 
scale. Theoretically,, this movement was predicted to be in 
the opposite direction for minority and majority influence. 
A different pattern of results was predicted for the 
majority and minority members of each group. Therefore, the 
data obtained from members of minorities and majorities 
within groups were analyzed separately. The analyses 
corresponding to the individuals who were majority members 
in each group may be found under the minority influence 
subheadings. The analyses corresponding to the individuals 
who were minority members in each group are presented under 
the majority influence headings. 
Myers, Dicecco, & Lorch (1981) argue that group level 
data are often analyzed incorrectly because, in many 
instances, the individual scores that comprise the group 
averages are not independently distributed, that is, they 
are correlated. This tends to inflate the probability of 
making a Type I error, because the variance attributable to 
the covariation of individual scores contributes more to the 
numerator than to the denominator of the test statistic. 
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When the individual scores are correlated, and the unit of 
analysis is the individual, quasi-E ratios should be 
computed in order to ensure that the expected value of the E 
ratio under the null hypothesis equals one. Therefore, 
quasi-E ratios were computed where appropriate, as noted, 
for the analyses reported below. 
In order to test the hypotheses corresponding to 
attitude change, change scores were computed for all 
individuals. Change scores were calculated by subtracting 
the posttest attitude score from the prettest attitude 
score. The means for both the pretest and the posttest 
attitude scores, for each condition are presented in Table 1 
below. 
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Table 1 
Mean Attitude Scores and Standard Deviations at Pretest and 
Posttest for Minority and Majority Influence Types 
Group Member 
Type 
Minority 
Majority 
Unanimous 
Groups 
Pre Post 
*** 
31.8 
13.4 
*** 
36.8 
12.2 
Condition 
Four Majority 
Members 
One Minority 
Member 
Pre Post 
-25.0 
13.5 
33.1 
12.4 
.o 
17.8 
34.0 
17.3 
Three Majority 
Two Minority 
Members 
Pre Post 
-26.8 -18.8 
13.3 16.5 
32.3 29.2 
13.5 15.0 
Note. The first number corresponds to the mean attitude 
score, the second number corresponds to the standard 
deviation. 
The mean change score for each influence type, for each 
condition within the experimental design,is presented in 
Table 2 below. 
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Table 2 
Mean Change Scores Standard Deviations and Cell Size 
for Minority and Majority Influence Types 
Condition 
Unanimous 
Groups 
Four Majority 
Members 
One Minority 
Member 
Three Majority 
Group Member 
Type 
Minority 
Majority 
*** 
5.00 
5.46 
(n=50) 
25.00 
16.67 
(n=lO) 
.88 
7.02 
(n=40) 
Two Minority 
Members 
8.00 
9.41 
(n=20) 
-3.17 
4.11 
(n=30) 
Note. Positive change scores indicate movement toward the 
majority position. Negative change scores indicate movement 
toward minority position. The first number is the change 
score mean, the second is the standard deviation, and the 
third is the number of individuals within the cell. 
Attitude Change Due to Minority Influence 
It was hypothesized that individuals in groups with no 
minority members (unanimous groups) would become more 
extreme in their post-discussion attitudes than would 
individuals in groups with one or two minority members 
present. 
A one-way analysis of variance (using the quasi-E 
procedure described previously) with three levels (unanimous 
groups, groups with one minority, groups with two 
minorities) was performed on the change scores. The 
analysis of variance source table is presented in Table 3. 
26 
Table 3 
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Change Scores 
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Degrees Mean Quasi p 
source of Square E 
Freedom 
Between 
Groups 2 1,336.03 10.42 .01 .42 
Within 
Groups 23 128.25 
As predicted, a significant main effect for condition was 
found. Two a priori determined follow up tests were 
performed. The first compared the unanimous groups 
condition to a weighted combination of the minority 
influence conditions. As predicted, the attitude change 
scores of individuals who were members of unanimous groups 
differed significantly from those of the individuals in both 
minority influence conditions E'(l,19) = 7.00, p < .025. 
Unanimous groups became more extreme in their post-
discussion attitudes, whereas groups with one minority 
member changed very little, and groups with two minority 
members actually became less extreme (see Table 1 for 
means). The pattern of means supports the notion that 
single minority members are influential in a way that 
prevents the majority members from becoming more extreme. 
The second follow-up test, contrary to expectations, 
revealed that there were no significant differences between 
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the two minority influence conditions, E'(l,16) = 2.47, n.s. 
Possible changes in the dichotomous (In favor/Against) 
responses were assessed using Fisher's Exact test. The two 
minority influence conditions were combined for this 
analysis. The number and relative frequency of individuals 
who changed their position are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Number and Relative Freguency of Change on Dichotomous 
Response for Majority Members 
Condition 
Unanimous Groups with 
Groups Minority 
Change Members 
Yes 0 2 
.00 .02 
No 50 68 
.42 .56 
Note. The first number corresponds to the number of 
individuals who changed/did not change on the dichotomous 
response and the second number corresponds to the relative 
frequency. 
There was not a significant relationship between condition 
(unanimous groups and minority influence) and changes in 
position (In favor/Against) regarding the issue of 
establishing English as the official language of the United 
States, (Fisher's Exact, p =.34). 
Attitude Change Due to Majority Influence 
In order to test the hypothesis that minorities of one 
would change in the direction of the majority more than 
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would minorities of two, a one-way analysis of variance with 
two levels (one minority member faced with a majority of 
four and two minority members faced with a majority of 
three) was performed on the change scores. Once again, 
quasi-E ratios were used in this analysis because the unit 
of analysis is the ~ndividual. The analysis of variance 
source table is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Change Scores 
Minorities of One and Minorities of Two 
Degrees Mean Quasi 
Source of Square E 
Freedom 
Between 
Groups 1 2167.20 8.89 .01 .33 
Within 
Groups 14 243.75 
As predicted, a significant main effect for condition was 
found. Minorities of one clearly changed more than did 
minorities of two (see Table 2 for means). These results 
are much in line with the predictions made by the three 
models of social influence (Latane, 1981; Mullen, 1983; and 
Tanford & Penrod, 1984). 
Possible changes in the dichotomous (In favor/Against) 
responses were assessed using a Fisher's exact test. The 
number and relative frequency of individuals who changed 
their position are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Number and Relative Freguency of Change on Dichotomous 
Response for Minority Members 
Change 
Yes 
No 
Condition 
Groups with 
One Minority 
Member 
5 
.17 
5 
.17 
Groups with 
Two Minorities 
Members 
4 
.13 
16 
.53 
Note. The first number corresponds to the number of 
individuals who changed/did not change on the dichotomous 
response and the second number corresponds to the relative 
frequency. 
There was not a significant relationship between condition 
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(minority of one, minorities of two) and changes in position 
(In favor/Against) regarding the issue of establishing 
English as the official language of the United States, 
(Fisher's Exact, p =.10). 
Minority Influence Thought Listing Analyses 
The arguments and counterarguments generated by each 
subject were content analyzed by four independent coders 
(each set of data was rated by two coders). Each coder 
determined whether the statements listed represented 
thoughts in favor of (arguments), against 
(counterarguments), or irrelevant to the issue, which was 
either establishing English as the official language of the 
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United States or allowing homosexuals to marry legally. The 
interobserver reliability (percentage agreement) averaged 
across all coders for the entire data set was approximately 
95%. The number of arguments and counterarguments listed by 
each individual were used to compute two sets of cognitive 
activity scores for both issues. Cognitive fluency scores 
were computed by adding the listed arguments to the listed 
counterarguments. Cognitive flexibility scores were 
determined by subtracting counterarguments from arguments 
and dividing by the cognitive fluency score. The absolute 
value of this ratio was used in the analyses. Therefore, 
the cognitive flexibility scores could range from o (perfect 
flexibility, that is, the generation of an equal number of 
arguments and counterarguments) to 1 (the generation of 
either arguments or counterarguments only). 
Minority Influence Cognitive Fluency Analyses: English 
Language Issue 
In order to test the hypothesis that influence type 
would have an effect upon the number of arguments and 
counterarguments individuals would generate regarding 
establishing English as the official language of the United 
States, a one-way analysis of variance with three levels 
(unanimous groups, majority members exposed to one minority, 
and majority members exposed to two minorities) was 
performed on the cognitive fluency scores for this issue. 
The analysis of variance source table is presented in Table 
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7 below. 
Table 7 
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Cognitive Fluency 
Establishing English as the Official Language of U.S. 
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Degrees Mean Quasi p 
Source of Square E 
Freedom 
Between 
Groups 2 35.43 3.86 .05 .19 
Within 
Groups 22 9.18 
As predicted, a significant main effect for condition was 
found. An a priori determined follow up test revealed that 
unanimous groups had lower cognitive fluency scores 
(M=6.740) than majority members exposed to one minority 
member (M=7.925), and majority members exposed to two 
minority members (M=7.700), E'(l,24) = 4.47, p < .05 In 
order to determine whether the differences found between 
conditions was due to individuals exposed to minority 
influence generating more counterarguments only, two one-way 
analyses of variance with three levels were performed on the 
number of arguments and counterarguments generated for 
establishing English as the official language of the United 
States. The analysis of variance source table corresponding 
to total arguments generated in favor of establishing 
English as the official language of the United States is 
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presented in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Analysis of Variance Source Table: English Arguments 
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Source Degrees Mean Quasi R 
of Square E 
Freedom 
Between 
Groups 2 17.53 3.62 .05 .16 
Within 
Groups 24 4.84 
A significant main effect for condition was found. A follow 
up test comparing unanimous groups (M=4.56) to a weighted 
average of the two minority influence conditions, that is 
groups exposed to a minority of one (M=5.25), and groups 
exposed to two minority members (M=4.87), while not 
statistically significant, showed a trend in the predicted 
direction E'(l,25) = 4.08, R < .10. Individuals exposed to 
minority influence did not generate significantly more 
arguments than individuals in unanimous groups. The second 
one-way analysis of variance with three levels was performed 
on the number of counterarguments generated by the 
individuals within each condition. The analysis of variance 
source table for counterarguments generated is presented in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9 
Analysis of Variance Source Table: English Counterarguments 
unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Source 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
2 
24 
Mean 
Square 
9.67 
4.48 
Quasi 
.E 
2.15 .25 
The mean number of counterarguments generated by unanimous 
groups (M=2.18), groups exposed to one minority (M=2.67) and 
groups exposed to two minority members (M=2.833) did not 
differ significantly. 
Minority Influence Cognitive Flexibility Analyses: English 
Language Issue 
In order to test the hypothesis that individuals 
exposed to minority influence would list thoughts that were 
more flexible in nature (i.e., were representative of both 
sides of the issue) a one-way analysis of variance was 
performed on the individual cognitive fluency scores for 
establishing English as the official language of the United 
States. The analysis of variance source table corresponding 
to the analysis of cognitive fluency scores for the issue of 
establishing English as the official language of the United ...,...__/ .· .... ~ 
States is presented in Table 10. 
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Table 10. 
Analysis of Variance Source Table: English Flexibility 
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Source Degrees Mean Quasi 
of Square E 
Freedom 
Between 
Groups 2 .1887 1.53 .25 
Within 
Groups 20 .1226 
The cognitive flexibility scores for individuals who were 
members of unanimous groups (M=.3861) did not differ 
significantly from individuals who were exposed to a 
minority of one (M=.3893), or individuals who were exposed 
to two minority members (M=.2960). 
Cognitive Fluency Analyses:Homosexuals Legally Marrying 
Issue 
It was hypothesized that individuals who were exposed 
to minority influence would generate more arguments and 
counterarguments than would individuals who were members of 
unanimous groups on a subsequent issue (allowing homosexuals 
to marry legally), unrelated to the issue discussed as a 
group. It is important to note at this point that the 
individual members of the group were not aware of their 
fellow group members' opinions on this particular issue. An 
individual was classified as either a minority member or 
majority member based only on their response to the issue of 
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establishing English as the official language of the United 
States. It was quite feasible that many of the individuals 
classified as majority members had minority opinions within 
their respective group regarding this second issue, but the 
data were collected in such a way that these individuals 
were never made aware of how their response compared to 
others. The issue of interest with regard to the following 
analysis is whether the pattern of results with respect to 
cognitive activity could be replicated for a subsequent 
issue not discussed as a group. In order to test this 
hypothesis, a one-way analysis of variance with three levels 
(Unanimous groups, minority of one, two minorities) was 
performed on the cognitive fluency score. Quasi-E ratios 
were not used for this particular analysis, because there 
was no group interaction (i.e., discussion, knowledge of one 
another's position etc.) for this issue. 
The analysis of variance source table corresponding to 
this analysis is presented in Table 11. 
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Table 11 
Analysis of Variance Source Table: Cognitive Fluency 
Allowing Homosexuals to Marry Legally 
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Source Degrees Sum of Mean E I! !M.2 
of Squares Square 
Freedom 
Between 
Groups 2 31.72 15.86 3.08 .05 .04 
Within 
Groups 117 600.87 5.14 
Total 119 632.59 
A significant main effect for condition was found. A 
follow up test comparing unanimous groups (M=5.60) to a 
weighted average of the two minority influence conditions, 
that is groups exposed to a minority of one (N=6.75), and 
groups exposed to two minority members (M=6.43) revealed 
that the differences between unanimous and minority 
influence groups was significant E (1,117)=5.63, 
I! < .05. In order to determine whether there were 
differences between conditions with respect to the type of 
thoughts generated (arguments/counterarguments), two one-way 
analyses of variance with three levels were performed on the 
number of arguments and counterarguments generated for 
allowing homosexuals to marry legally. It should be noted 
that arguments/counterarguments were reverse scored for 
individuals who expressed that they were against allowing 
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homosexuals to marry legally. In other words, individuals 
against allowing homosexuals to marry legally would have 
placed thoughts in line with their opinion in the 
counterarguments column and the thoughts against their 
position in the arguments column. The analysis of variance 
corresponding to arguments generated is presented in Table 
12. 
Table 12 
Analysis of Variance Source Table: Arguments 
Allowing Homosexuals to Marry Legally 
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Source Degrees Sum of Mean .E p fil.2 
of Squares Square 
Freedom 
Between 
Groups 2 .85 .42 .14 .87 
Within 
Groups 117 345.02 2.95 
Total 119 345.87 
There was not a significant main effect for condition with 
respect to the number of arguments (thoughts in favor of the 
individuals respective position). The second one-way 
analysis of variance was performed on the number of 
counterarguments (thoughts generated against one's position) 
generated. The analysis of variance source table is 
presented in Table 13. 
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Table 13 
Analysis of Variance Source Table: Counterarguments 
Allowing Homosexuals to Marry Legally 
unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Source Degrees Sum of Mean :E p !!!.2 
of Squares Square 
Freedom 
Between 
Groups 2 23.50 11.75 4.14 .02 .05 
Within 
Groups 117 332.49 2.84 
Total 119 355.99 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect for 
condition. A follow up test compared the mean number of 
counterarguments generated by individuals who were members 
of unanimous groups (M=l.64) to a weighted average of the 
mean number of counterarguments generated by individuals who 
were faced with one minority member (M=2.60), and 
individuals who were faced with two minority members 
(M=2.43). This analysis revealed that individuals who were 
exposed to minority influence generated more 
counterarguments than individuals who were members of 
unanimous groups, :E (1,117)= 7.95, p < .01. 
Cognitive Flexibility Analyses: Homosexuals Marrying Legally 
Issue 
It was also hypothesized that individuals who were 
members of groups with minority members would generate 
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thoughts that were more flexible in nature than would 
individuals who were members of unanimous groups for the 
issue of allowing homosexuals to marry legally. In order to 
test this hypothesis, a one-way analysis of variance with 
three levels (individuals in unanimous groups, individuals 
exposed to one minority member, and individuals exposed to 
two minority members) was performed on the flexibility 
scores for the issue of allowing homosexuals to marry 
legally. The analysis of variance source table for this 
analysis is presented in Table 14. 
Table 14 
Analysis of Variance Source Table: Cognitive Flexibility 
Allowing Homosexuals to Marry Legally 
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence 
Source 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Total 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
2 
117 
119 
Sum of 
Squares 
.102 
12.917 
13.019 
Mean 
Square 
.05 
.11 
p 
.46 .63 
Contrary to expectations, the cognitive flexibility scores 
did not differ significantly for individuals who were 
members of unanimous groups (M=.4711), individuals who were 
exposed to one minority member (M=.4036), and individuals 
who were exposed to two minority members (M=.4352). 
Discussion 
This study was designed to measure directly the impact 
of minority members upon majority members within the context 
of freely interacting groups by comparing groups with 
minority members to those without minority members. More 
specifically, this study was an attempt to understand better 
the possible qualitative differences between minority and 
majority influence. 
The mathematical models of social influence reviewed in 
the introduction of this paper and the empirical test of 
these models conducted by Tindale et al. (1990) all suggest 
that minorities of one have relatively little impact upon 
majorities. It was suggested at the outset of this paper 
that such a conclusion may be premature because the 
possibility that minority members reduce the degree of 
polarization in majority members' attitudes had yet to be 
explored. The overall pattern of mean change scores 
obtained in this study offer somewhat tentative empirical 
support for the notion that minority influence is analogous 
to a reign or a weight preventing the majority's movement 
toward a more extreme position. Although the groups that 
were exposed to a minority of one did shift in the direction 
of the majority, this shift was very slight (not even one 
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point on the 21-point scale), relative to that of the 
unanimous groups (five points on the 21-point scale). 
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The prevailing paradigm in the study of social 
influence has consistently defined influence as movement 
toward a particular position (i.e., changes in preferences, 
attitudes etc.). In light of the results obtained in the 
present study, the dependence upon shifting as evidence that 
influence has occurred poses a special problem for the study 
of minority influence. Minority influence (especially in 
the case of single minorities) may not be strong enough to 
produce shifts toward the minority position, but this should 
not necessarily be taken as evidence that no influence has 
occurred. For example, the results presented in Table 4 
revealed that only two of the 40 individuals exposed to 
minority influence changed their position (In Favor/Against) 
on the language issue. Clearly, the minority members in 
this study were not influential enough to cause a change in 
position. On the other hand, the minority members were 
influential in that they were either able to reduce the 
degree of polarization in the majority members' attitudes, 
or cause majority members to shift toward their position. 
Although it is empirically difficult to measure the type of 
influence that is being alluded to, the methodology utilized 
in the present study (a unanimous groups control condition), 
certainly appears to be promising method of studying 
minority influence. 
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The overall pattern of means for the minority members 
within each group was in line with the predictions made by 
the three models of social influence (Latane, 1981; Mullen, 
1983; and Tanford & Penrod, 1984). As the number of 
minorities increased and the number of majorities decreased, 
the shifts toward the majority position became less extreme. 
The results of the present study fail to offer 
straightforward support for the notion that minority and 
majority influence differ qualitatively. Although 
individuals who were members of unanimous groups had 
significantly lower cognitive fluency scores than the 
individuals who were exposed to minority influence for the 
issue of establishing English as the official language of 
the United states, the pattern of results obtained when 
arguments and counterarguments were analyzed separately were 
somewhat counterintuitive. The fact that the three 
experimental groups differed significantly with respect to 
the number of arguments generated, but not with respect to 
the number of counterarguments generated is certainly not in 
line with the notion that minorities inspire divergent 
thinking. A divergent thought style for the majority 
members exposed to minority influence would involve the 
generation of more counterarguments than the unanimous group 
members. These results become even more puzzling when one 
considers that the majority members who were exposed to 
minority influence were certainly more likely to hear 
arguments against their position than were the individuals 
who were members of unanimous groups. 
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The results found are somewhat suggestive of McGuire's 
(1964) inoculation theory. This theory suggests that when 
an individual is faced with weak counterarguments against 
her/his position, these counterarguments prompt the 
individual to generate more thoughts in line with their own 
position in an attempt to refute the weak counterarguments. 
The theory also suggests that these refutational defenses 
serve to bolster the attitude of the individual. This does 
not seem to be the case in this particular study because the 
results obtained for the attitude change scores indicate 
that the minority members were influential. Of course, it 
cannot be assumed that the arguments and counterarguments 
generated by the individuals mediated their attitude change 
because the thoughts were listed after the individuals 
responded to the post-discussion attitude scale, not before. 
The differences between the groups with respect to the 
thought listing data for the second issue (allowing 
homosexuals to marry legally) suggest that individuals 
generate more thoughts regarding a subsequent, unrelated 
issue when they are exposed to minority influence than when 
they are members of a unanimous group. The interesting 
difference between the results obtained from the analyses of 
the two issues is that the results from the second issue are 
much more in line with what would be expected within the 
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divergent thinking paradigm than are the results of the 
first issue. Individuals exposed to minority influence did 
not generate significantly more arguments (i.e., thoughts in 
favor of their own position) than the members of unanimous 
groups, but they did generate more thoughts against their 
position. Nemeth (1986) has consistently shown, using a 
variety of dependent variables, that individuals exposed to 
minority influence not only think more divergently, but that 
this thought style generalizes to subsequent, unrelated 
tasks. The present study attempted to replicate this 
finding using a different dependent variable (i.e., thought 
listing data). The present study successfully replicated 
the finding for the second issue, but failed to do so for 
the first issue. It is difficult to attribute the pattern 
of results to any one factor, for the thought listing data 
for the two issues are not entirely equivalent. That is, 
the first issue was discussed as a group and the thoughts 
generated were more than likely affected by the group 
discussion, whereas the thoughts listed for the second issue 
were the product of an individual effort. Once again, 
McGuire's (1964) inoculation theory may be useful in 
explaining these differences. For the first issue, 
individuals had to actively participate in a conversation 
regarding the issue, and because they actually heard the 
counterarguments generated by the minority members, they may 
have focused primarily upon generating refutational 
defenses. There was no need to defend one's position for 
the second issue, therefore, it was not necessary for the 
individual to direct his/her cognitive activity toward 
defending his/her position. The absence of motivation to 
defend their own position may have allowed individuals to 
think more divergently about the issue. 
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The differences found in cognitive activity for each 
issue also point out the importance of studying majority and 
minority influence in freely interacting groups. It is 
quite possible that group interaction or the expectation 
that one will have to interact with group members who have 
differing opinions leads to a different type of cognitive 
activity. The studies supporting the notion that minority 
and majority influence differ qualitatively (e.g., Maass, & 
Clark, 1984; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983), 
have failed to consider this important difference because, 
in most cases, interaction with other group members was 
impossible (e.g., reading a prepared script of minority 
arguments). It was mentioned at the outset of this paper 
that a different pattern of results might be obtained when 
minority and majority members actually interact. This 
hypothesized difference was attributed to the interactive 
nature of social influence (i.e., minority members 
influencing and becoming influenced by majority members and 
vice versa). Although the results of this study reveal 
differences with respect to cognitive activity when the 
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groups interacted and when they did not, the data do not 
allow for the identification of exactly what brought about 
this change. It is quite possible that the subjects began 
to generate arguments in favor of their position as soon as 
they realized that they would have to discuss the issue. It 
is also possible that the difference in cognitive activity 
was brought about after being exposed to the minority 
arguments. The former explanation has been supported 
recently by Levine (1991), where individuals who expected to 
interact with minority or majority members generated more 
arguments consistent with their own position than 
individuals who did not expect to interact with others. 
Nonetheless, more research directed toward this issue 
certainly needs to be conducted. 
The differences in cognitive activity found with 
respect to the two issues could also be attributed to 
something inherent in the issue of allowing homosexuals to 
marry legally. The arguments and counterarguments generated 
for this particular issue seemed qualitatively different 
from those generated for establishing English as the 
official language of the United States. The individuals' 
position with respect to the issue seemed more apparent when 
reading over their listed thoughts. This difference, of 
course, has important implications for the coding of the 
arguments and counterarguments. If the coders felt as if 
they could successfully guess the position of the 
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individual, this perceived knowledge could have biased their 
counting of the arguments and counterarguments. Although 
the intraobserver reliability was quite high (95%), each of 
the coders could have been affected in the same manner. 
Such an outcome would not have altered their overall 
agreement rate. 
The thoughts generated for the issue of establishing 
English as the official language of the United States seemed 
to be based more on facts and on the hypothetical 
implications of establishing such a law, whereas the 
thoughts generated for the issue of allowing homosexuals to 
marry legally seemed to be more subjective and affect laden 
(e.g., being sickened at the thought of homosexuals, 
considering homosexuals not worthy of their civil rights). 
It may be that it is more difficult for individuals to 
generate arguments against their position when the issue 
lends itself to the generation of facts rather than 
feelings. That is, one would have to have adequate 
knowledge of or be quite familiar with the implications of 
establishing English as the official language of the United 
States in order to generate a list of arguments and 
counterarguments regarding the issue. The differences found 
between the two issues may be due, in part, to different 
levels of familiarity with the implications of allowing 
homosexuals to marry legally and establishing English as the 
official language of the United States. 
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It is important to note, at this point, that the 
thought listing data collected in this study may not reflect 
completely all of the thoughts the individuals were thinking 
at the time, and the results obtained in this study should 
certainly be interpreted in light of this flaw. Although 
all individuals were given ten minutes to list all of the 
thoughts they had for both issues, most individuals did not 
write for the entire ten minutes. Furthermore, even though 
subjects were instructed to work independently on each task, 
the experimenter noticed that once it became obvious that 
one individual in the group had stopped writing, it was only 
a matter of moments before the other four individuals did 
the same. If individuals started listing the thoughts in 
favor of their position and moved to the counterarguments 
column after the arguments column, (or vice versa for the 
second issue when the individual was against allowing 
homosexuals to marry legally) the pattern of results 
obtained are as would be expected given for the first issue, 
given that the individuals may have discontinued writing not 
because they had listed all of their thoughts against the 
issue, but rather because it appeared as if other members of 
the group had stopped writing. This flaw could have been 
avoided had the individuals been moved from the large table 
and seated in such a way that would make the monitoring of 
others writing behavior impossible. Although this flaw may 
help explain the failure to find significant differences 
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between groups with respect to the number of 
counterarguments generated for the first issue, it is not 
clear why the obtained results for the second issue reveal a 
significant difference with respect to the number of 
counterarguments generated. 
The mean flexibility scores for both establishing 
English as the official language and allowing homosexuals to 
marry legally fail to support the notion that the cognitive 
activity of individuals who are exposed to minority 
influence is more flexible in nature. Although the results 
of one study certainly should not be overgeneralized, and 
these results should be interpreted in light of the 
previously mentioned flaw in the collection of the thought 
listing data, it may be beneficial to investigate 
alternative measures of divergent thinking. For example, 
the novelty of the arguments and counterarguments for a 
particular issue could be explored. 
It should be noted that the individuals who coded the 
arguments and counterarguments were instructed to consider 
all thoughts in favor of and against the issue regardless of 
the degree to which they were grounded in reality. That is, 
fallacious arguments (e.g., "Columbus discovered America and 
he spoke English, therefore the official language of the 
United states should be English"; "allowing homosexuals to 
marry legally would increase the spread of AIDS"; "allowing 
homosexuals to marry would increase the incidence of 
50 
homosexuality") were considered to be just as valid as 
thoughts that were more in line with reality. In addition, 
arguments and counterarguments that were similar in 
implication but applied to different domains (e.g., 
"establishing English as the official language of the United 
states would reduce the amount of money spent on bilingual 
street signs"; "establishing English as the official 
language of the United states would reduce the amount of 
money spent teaching immigrants and their children to speak 
the language") were considered to be separate thoughts, even 
though they are representative of the general argument, 
establishing English as the official language of the United 
States would reduce the amount of money this country spends 
accommodating non-English speakers. Perhaps flexibility 
should not be measured in terms of the quantity, but rather 
in terms of the quality of arguments/counterarguments 
generated. 
The present study attempted to establish a higher level 
of ecological validity than is typically found in minority 
and majority influence studies in that each influence type 
was investigated within the context of freely interacting 
groups without the use of confederates. It was suggested 
that a different pattern of results than is typically found 
might be obtained because minority and majority members were 
truly allowed to become influenced and behave accordingly. 
The fact that the results from this study did not deviate to 
51 
any great extent from the results obtained in past research 
(with the exception of the cognitive activity results), 
certainly should not minimize the importance of studying 
influence within the context of freely interacting groups. 
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APPENDIX A 
English Attitude Scale 
Code 
Seat 
Please answer the following two questions. 
1. I am In Favor of Against 
our government passing a law that would make 
English the official language of the United States. 
2. Please circle the number below which best represents your 
opinion at this time concerning our government passing a 
law that would make English the official language of the 
United States 
+50+45+40+35+30+25+20+15+10+5 0-5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50 
Extremely Quite Somewhat Somewhat Quite Extremely 
IN FAVOR AGAINST 
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APPENDIX B 
English Thought Listing Form 
Code 
Seat 
In the spaces provided below, please list all of your 
thoughts about our government passing a law that would make 
English the official language of the United states. You 
will notice that there are separate columns for arguments 
and counterarguments. Place all of your thoughts in favor 
of passing a law that makes English the official language of 
the United States in the arguments column. Place all of 
your thoughts against passing a law that makes English the 
official language of the United states in the 
counterarguments column. Please do not feel as if you need 
to fill in an equal number of spaces on each side. It is 
very important, though, that you list every argument and 
counterargument that comes to mind. Please list each 
thought separately. 
ARGUMENTS COUNTERARGUMENTS 
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APPENDIX C 
Homosexuals Marrying Attitude Scale 
Code 
Seat 
Please answer the following two questions. 
1. I am In Favor of Against 
allowing homosexuals to marry legally. 
2.Please circle the number below which best represents your 
opinion at this time concerning allowing homosexuals to 
marry legally. 
+50+45+40+35+30+25+20+15+10+5 0-5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50 
Extremely Quite Somewhat Somewhat Quite Extremely 
IN FAVOR AGAINST 
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APPENDIX D 
Homosexuals Marrying Thought Listing Form 
Code 
Seat 
In the spaces provided below, please list all of your thoughts 
about allowing homosexuals to marry legally. You will notice 
that there are separate columns for arguments and 
counterarguments. Place all of your thoughts in favor of 
allowing homosexuals to marry legally in the arguments column. 
Place all of your thoughts against allowing homosexuals to 
marry legally int the counterarguments column. Please do not 
feel as if you need to fill in an equal number of spaces on 
each side. It is very important, though, that you list every 
argument ad counterargument that comes to mind. Please list 
each thought separately. 
ARGUMENTS COUNTERARGUMENTS 
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APPENDIX F 
Debriefing Form 
Most research regarding minority and majority influence 
in small groups seems to show that minority members are not as 
influential as majority members because their numbers are 
smaller. Most models of social influence predict the same 
relationship, that is, there is strength in numbers. This 
study was designed to measure directly the impact of minority 
members upon the majority members by comparing groups with 
minority members (individuals who disagree with the majority 
of their group members) to those without minority members 
(i.e., unanimous groups). More specifically, this study is an 
attempt to look at the type of impact minorities have upon 
majorities, as there is quite a bit of experimental and 
theoretical work suggesting that there are differences between 
majority and minority influence. 
If you should have any questions regarding this study, 
please feel free to contact the experimenter, Christine Smith, 
at 508-3031 or stop by her office in Darnen Hall room 661. 
Should you care to read more about this particular area of 
research, the following references would be a great place to 
start. Thank you very much for your participation. 
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